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AbstrAct
Introduction To move towards universal health coverage, 
the government of Kenya introduced free maternity 
services in all public health facilities in June 2013. User 
fees are, however, important sources of income for health 
facilities and their removal has implications for the way in 
which health facilities are governed.
Objective To explore how implementation of Kenya’s 
financing policy has affected the way in which the rules 
governing health facilities are made, changed, monitored 
and enforced.
Methods Qualitative research was carried out using 
semistructured interviews with 39 key stakeholders from 
six counties in Kenya: 10 national level policy makers, 
10 county level policy makers and 19 implementers at 
health facilities. Participants were purposively selected 
using maximum variation sampling. Data analysis was 
informed by the institutional analysis framework, in which 
governance is defined by the rules that distribute roles 
among key players and shape their actions, decisions and 
interactions.
results Lack of clarity about the new policy (eg, it was 
unclear which services were free, leading to instances of 
service user exploitation), weak enforcement mechanisms 
(eg, delayed reimbursement to health facilities, which led 
to continued levying of service charges) and misaligned 
incentives (eg, the policy led to increased uptake of 
services thereby increasing the workload for health 
workers and health facilities losing control of their ability 
to generate and manage their own resources) led to 
weak policy implementation, further complicated by the 
concurrent devolution of the health system.
conclusion The findings show the consequences of 
discrepancies between formal institutions and informal 
arrangements. In introducing new policies, policy makers 
should ensure that corresponding institutional (re)
arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and incentives 
are aligned with the objectives of the implementers.
IntrOductIOn
User fees are an important source of income 
for most health facilities in low- and middle-in-
come countries,1 2 and introducing a health 
financing policy into a health system, particu-
larly one which directly affects user fees, is not 
straightforward.2 3 Removal of user fees can 
have consequences for health facilities and the 
way they are governed. For example, the extent 
to which health facilities comply with the new 
policy (formal rule)—that is, choose to discon-
tinue levying user charges, may be influenced 
by the extent to which the policy is in line with 
existing norms and practices at the health 
facilities (informal rules). Despite its impor-
tance, this rules-based approach to studying 
health system governance has not been widely 
adopted in health policy and systems research.4 
In Kenya, several policies to reduce the 
financial burden of healthcare have been 
introduced since independence in 1963 
(figure 1). In 1996, the National Hospital 
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Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► Reports on the introduction of the free maternity 
services (FMS) policy in Kenya describe either 
the implementation (including the perspectives 
of health workers) or health system outcomes 
(provision of free maternal health services or 
increase in use of the service).
What are the new findings?
 ► Our study explores how the FMS policy affected the 
way in which the rules governing health facilities 
are made, changed, monitored and enforced.
 ► Our analysis and interpretation was informed by 
the institutional framing of governance, in which 
governance is defined by the rules for distributing 
roles among key players and shaping their actions, 
decisions and interactions.
 ► To our knowledge, no other studies have examined 
implementation of the FMS policy and how the 
rules governing health facilities in Kenya have been 
enforced, monitored and changed.
recommendations for policy
 ► The findings highlight discrepancies between 
formal institutions and informal arrangements, 
and their consequences. Therefore, in introducing 
new policies, policy makers should ensure that 
corresponding institutional (re)arrangements, 
enforcement mechanisms and incentives are 
aligned with the objectives of the implementers.
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Figure 1 History of user fees policies in Kenya. 10/20 policy: ceiling on user fees of KSH10 (US$$0.10) in dispensaries and 
KSH20 (US$$0.20) in health centres
Insurance Fund (NHIF) was established to finance 
healthcare in public and private facilities.5 This manda-
tory insurance scheme applies to workers from the formal 
sector earning more than KSH1000 a month. In 2004, the 
government set a ceiling on user fees of KSH10 (US$0.10) 
in dispensaries and KSH20 (US$0.20) in health centres 
(known as the 10/20 policy) with an exemption for chil-
dren aged <5 years, the poor and those with designated 
conditions such as malaria and tuberculosis.
In 2007, in addition to these exemptions, all fees for 
maternity care (uncomplicated births) at public health-
care facilities were abolished. The government then 
introduced the Health Sector Services Fund (HSSF), 
which transferred funds directly to health facilities to 
compensate for the loss of revenue as a result of the 
removal of user fees. Financed using domestic and donor 
resources, the HSSF was officially launched in 2010 with 
the aim of pooling public and donor resources.5 The 
funds are locally managed by the health facility manage-
ment committee, composed of community members.6
In 2010, the same year that the HSSF was launched, 
Kenya adopted a new constitution which devolved polit-
ical, administrative and financial functions to 47 newly 
created administrative units known as counties. In the 
health system, this involved devolving essential health 
service delivery to county governments while the central 
government retained responsibilities for health policy 
development, management of provincial hospitals (now 
national referral hospitals) and technical support to 
counties. However, there are no clear guidelines on how 
to implement the HSSF in the newly devolved health 
system.6
In June 2013, the government introduced two addi-
tional policies to reduce the financial burden of access to 
healthcare: abolition of user fees for all health services in 
public healthcare centres and dispensaries (primary care 
level); and free maternity services (FMS) services at all 
levels of care in the government health sector (primary, 
secondary and tertiary).7 These policies, FMS in partic-
ular, were part of a national strategy to reduce maternal 
and neonatal mortality, alleviate poverty and achieve the 
millennium development goal targets.7 The FMS policy 
was introduced when the Kenyan health system was 
undergoing devolution.
The Kenyan health system is evolving and new financing 
policies are being introduced within the recently decen-
tralised system. This study explores how the implementa-
tion of the FMS policy, introduced in 2013, has affected 
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Table 1 Key health indicators of the counties included in the study
Selected key indicators National
Kitui 
county
Machakos 
county
Makueni 
county
Nairobi 
county
Nakuru 
county
Narok 
county
Literacy rate of women aged 15–
49 years
87.8% 91.7% 95.3% 96.9% 96.5% 94% 94%
Delivery with skilled attendants 61.8% 46.2% 63.4% 54.6% 89.1% 69.5% 40.3%
Contraceptive prevalence rate 58% 57.3% 75.9% 80.3% 62.6% 56.8% 47.8%
All basic immunisation coverage aged 
12–23 months’ old
79% 69.3% 93.4% 92% 81.2% 79.2% 66.4%
Source, KDHS (2014).
the way in which the rules governing health facilities are 
made, changed, monitored and enforced. The frame-
work used in this study allowed us to highlight challenges 
to the implementation of FMS, particularly governance.
In this qualitative study, the experiences and opin-
ions of stakeholders at the health facility, county and 
national levels were analysed with a focus on institutions. 
This focus reflected the new institutional economics 
approach in which institutions are defined as encom-
passing both the formal and informal rules that underlie 
social and economic activity.8
The application of institutional economics as a theo-
retical basis for health systems research is not new: 
Bertone and Meessen developed a framework to evaluate 
the implementation of performance-based financing in 
Burundi.9 Abimbola et al adapted the multilevel frame-
work developed by Ostrom10 to assess governance of 
primary healthcare in Nigeria.10–13 Furthermore, Abim-
bola et al used the concept of transaction costs originally 
developed by Williamson (1979) to explore the barriers 
to accessing tuberculosis services in Nigeria.14 Other 
examples of institutional analysis can be found in our 
recent systematic review of frameworks for assessing 
health system governance.15
Previous reports and publications on introduction of 
FMS in Kenya describe either the implementation 
(including the perspectives of health workers) or health 
system outcomes (provision of free maternal health 
services or increased use of the service) without high-
lighting governance.7 16–18 In this study, we report an insti-
tutional analysis of the implementation of FMS policy in 
Kenya. The aim of this study is to understand how the 
policy altered health system governance in Kenya and 
to use the insights to inform policy implementation in 
Kenya and in other low- and middle-income countries.
MetHOds
study settings
The study was conducted in six of the 47 counties which 
make up Kenya (Nairobi, Machakos, Makueni, Kitui, 
Nakuru, Narok) purposively selected for logistical and 
feasibility reasons. According to the Kenya Service Avail-
ability and Readiness Assessment Mapping Report of 
2013, the counties included in the sample had a total 
population of 9.7 million (approximately 22% of the 
country).19 The six counties are served by 2066 health 
facilities, of which, 38% (784) are public health facilities 
(table 1).
study participants
Three groups were invited to take part in the study: 
(1) national level policy makers and key international 
players, (2) county level policy makers and (3) policy 
implementers at healthcare facilities. Participants were 
purposively selected using maximum variation sampling. 
In total, 39 out of 43 people invited were interviewed: 
10 national level policy makers, 10 county health officials 
and 19 healthcare providers from 10 purposively selected 
district and county level hospitals. Unavailability during 
the data collection period was the only reason given for 
non-participation. 
Table 2 and figure 2 illustrate the characteristics of 
respondents who participated in the study and their roles 
in maternal health policy in Kenya.
data collection and management
Data collection was carried out between April and 
October 2015. Semistructured interviews were conducted 
with a topic guide comprising a list of open-ended ques-
tions exploring factors influencing governance of the 
health system after the introduction of FMS in 2013. 
Topics discussed included: key strategic policies in 
maternal health including the FMS policy; stakeholder 
involvement in policy development; the extent to which 
the policies have been enforced and the responsiveness 
of these policies to the population’s needs. Depending 
on the availability and willingness of the respondents, 
interviews lasted between 30 and 90 min. All interviews 
were conducted in English, transcribed verbatim into 
Microsoft Word.
data analysis
The approach taken was ‘directed content data analysis’, 
in which data are organised using an existing theoretical 
framework.20 Inductive coding was used to identify codes 
related to implementation of the FMS policy. Once the 
codes were identified, a deductive approach was used 
to group the data into relevant categories based on the 
theoretical framework adopted in this study.8 (figure 3)
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Table 2 Characteristics of respondents who participated in the study
Health system level Institution Participant
Participated
(n=39)
Invited
(n=43)
National (policy) Ministry of Health; multilateral and 
bilateral organisations
Senior directors and advisors 10 11
County (policy) County Health Department Chief Officer of Health 5 6
County Director ofHealth 5 6
Facility (implementation) Government health facilities offering 
comprehensive maternity care
Doctor in charge 10 10
Nurse in charge of maternity 9 10
Figure 2 Distribution of county and facility level 
respondents who participated in the study.
Figure 3 Illustration of the theoretical framework used in 
the study.
theoretical framework
Douglas North defines institutions as ‘the rules of the 
game’ and organisations as ‘the players of the game’.8 
Institutions consist of formal rules (political or legal 
rules such as constitutions, policies and contracts) and 
informal rules (such as code of conduct, behavioural 
norms and conventions).8 21 On the other hand, organ-
isations comprise groups of individuals with common 
objectives.8 North’s principal argument is that the 
actions, decisions and relations of individuals within an 
organisation are both enabled and constrained by formal 
and informal rules which constitute the institutions.8
We used this framework and refer to health facilities 
(and the health workers who work within them) in this 
study as organisations while ‘institutional arrangements’ 
are the configurations of the rules. Enforcement of the 
rules8 21 can occur via self-enforcement, such as common 
beliefs, reputation, kinship, or via third-party enforce-
ment, such as legal sanction, contracts, rules, laws or 
policing.8
Incentives and motivations are instrumental in 
achieving the organisational objective—for example, 
delivery of FMS. In line with the ‘principal-agent’ theory, 
agents (ie, health workers in a health facility) may 
comply with the FMS policy if incentives are aligned 
with the agents’ expectations.22 In this study, two types of 
motivation are discussed: intrinsic motivation (the health 
workers comply with the new policy arrangement as s/
he values the goal of the policy) and extrinsic motivation 
(the health workers expect to benefit by complying with 
the new policy).9
Formal and informal rules and their enforcement 
mechanisms define ‘property rights’ of individuals. ‘Prop-
erty rights’ include decision-making rights and earning 
rights which the individuals hold on different assets (eg, 
patent, trademark, a piece of land).23‘Decision-making 
right’ is the decision space or decision-making authority 
allowed by the principal (eg, the government) to agents 
(ie, health facilities).24 There are two forms of decision 
space: formal decision space allowed by formal rules and 
regulations which can be enforced, and informal deci-
sion space which is the actual exercise of authority which 
may deviate from the rules.24 In this study, 'earning rights’ 
refers to the decision space allowed to health facilities to 
generate income through user fees.
ethics
This study was approved by the Liverpool School of Trop-
ical Medicine ethics review committee (ref no: 14–052) 
and the Kenyatta National Hospital-University of Nairobi 
ethics research committee (ref no: KNH-ERC/A/98). 
Participation in the study was voluntary and no incen-
tives were given. At the beginning of each interview, the 
participants were asked to read the letter of consent, 
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Box 1 Illustrative quotes: formal institutional 
arrangements
“If we are taking care of 50% of the healthcare, then why not have 
half the board from faith based and the other half from the Ministry.” 
(Health worker, KI-10)
“You cannot give everything for free…and if the government 
abolishes user fee, then they must support the hospitals and give 
them money to run, but as it is now, money does not come. XX 
hospital received money only once and it was last year in January, 
since 2013 when the President started this policy he has never 
given (our hospital) any money and maybe it is not his fault, maybe 
he doesn’t even know, but the people below him are sitting on that 
money.” (Health worker, KI-16)
“So, there was no understanding and some places even right 
now I read in the newspaper, that some counties were going back 
to, were threatening to start charging and actually some facilities 
were charging hospitals. But why they were charging is because of 
the government. They were complaining that the government is not 
reimbursing promptly.” (National policy maker, KI-15)
“Money was being delayed. Because it was the facility to provide 
the services and then they get reimbursement after providing us with 
the data or of the women were delivered. But you know, get those 
reports and all those things are usually lengthy and some delayed.” 
(National policy maker, KI-5)
“Last year I had an incidence and we took it up to the office. It 
was a casual worker, in the evening, she was going around and telling 
them ‘Have you been discharged? You want to go home tomorrow give 
me money’. Actually, it was two thousand at that time and the mother 
was a bit in doubt, why has she asked for money and these are free 
services, so she kept quiet and called the nurse later.” (Health worker, 
KI-25)
“Give me five hundred shillings, I sell to you, the things could be 
in theatre, they could be available, but now because the mother is 
desperate, the relative wants his or her patient to be operated on, now 
someone takes advantage…. they thought the surgical spirit or the 
betadine, they thought it is not available in the hospital and they need 
to go and buy so that the patients are operated on while the things are 
still there this guy just wants to exploit.” (Health worker, KI-24)
“You find patient has not been given a receipt then you ask the 
patient and find the person who was there, took the money and did 
not give the receipt, so those are the people we deal with most of the 
time, petty issues like taking money from patients.” (Health worker, 
KI-19)
indicate their willingness to participate and record it on 
the consent form. The researchers also obtained consent 
to audio record the interview. Anonymity of study partic-
ipants was assured and maintained during data manage-
ment, analysis and dissemination.
FIndIngs
Using the theoretical framework adopted in this study, 
illustrated in figure 3, we identified the following 
four themes that highlight the ways in which the FMS 
policy affected health system governance: (1) formal and 
informal institutional (re)arrangements; (2) enforce-
ment mechanisms; (3) property rights and (4) incentives 
and motivation.
Institutional (re)arrangements
Formal institutional (re)arrangements
The president of Kenya abolished user fees for maternal 
health services in public facilities in June 2013. Subse-
quently, the national Ministry of Health (MOH) issued a 
circular confirming the abolition of user fees and provi-
sion of free maternal healthcare. Respondents across all 
participant groups (national, county and facility level) 
agreed with the objective of abolishing fees for mater-
nity services. However, they observed that introducing 
the FMS policy at the same time as devolution affected 
implementation of FMS. In particular, they recognised 
that devolution had changed the way in which the health 
system was governed. For instance, responsibility for 
governance had been devolved from the national govern-
ment to the county.
At health facility level, respondents thought that the 
FMS policy was too limited as it included only public 
health facilities (ie, less than half of healthcare facili-
ties across Kenya) (box 1, KI-10). Respondents from the 
MOH also acknowledged these limitations. The govern-
ment has subsequently been trying to find ways to inte-
grate the policy with other financing mechanisms such 
as the NHIF, a scheme established to finance healthcare 
in both public and private facilities, and include private 
facilities under the FMS scheme.
Participants mentioned the institutional arrangements 
for reimbursement and the complexity of the process. 
Facilities must request funding through the county health 
department which, in turn, submits facility data (eg, the 
number of births) to support the claim to the National 
Health Treasury. The National Health Treasury verifies 
the county requests by triangulating the data received 
with routine District Health Information System data. 
Funds are then transferred to the relevant county health 
treasury where further processing takes place before the 
funds reach the health facility. Respondents at all levels of 
the health system had encountered challenges because of 
inefficiencies in the reimbursement processes, including 
delays in receiving disbursements and the receipt of 
insufficient funds. These challenges frequently affected 
planning at the health facility level (box 1, KI-16).
Informants from different levels of the health system 
highlighted the consequences of weak formal rules—for 
instance, the inefficiency of information dissemination, as 
they did not receive the correct information (the content 
of the FMS package and reimbursement amount) in 
time. Health workers had ‘not seen a written circular and it 
was difficult (for them) to know what was free’ (KI-9). Health 
workers explained their dilemma regarding the public 
expectation versus the actual content of the policy, ‘the 
public expects that when they walk through the (facility) gate, 
everything should be free’ (KI-9). Some counties sometimes 
‘threatened to charge’ user fees for maternity services while 
others continued to charge for the first few months after 
the FMS policy was introduced until the information 
and guidelines became clear (box 1, KI-15). National 
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Box 2 Illustrative quotes: informal institutional 
arrangements
“We have been funding some of these programme on the county 
budget, for example when you look at the referral we have been 
funding from the county budget as we wait for the funding from the 
maternity reimbursement.” (County official, KI-30)
“They are using the NHIF and maybe they are given the 
prescription to buy the drugs., It is a challenge because somebody 
tells you I am using the NHIF card and you are telling us to buy the 
drugs, so it is hard to convince that person to tell him to go and buy 
the drugs. But at times, they used to buy because there is nothing else 
you can do.” (Health worker, KI-39)
“Even you go to XX facility, you find that most of them will come 
and go there, they don’t get medications…, it has to be free but it’s 
not fully free. They have to pay some fee.” (Health worker, KI-11)
“Actually, we tell them to buy everything…we should have just 
told them to pay and use that money (ourselves at facility level) to buy 
whatever we need. It could have been better than us telling them it is 
free and (then) we are not able to provide them good quality services.” 
(Health worker, KI-36)
“You have to borrow from the suppliers and promise to pay when 
you get the money, so that is how we have been coping.” (County 
official, KI-21)
“We have so many mothers, it (the FMS) is a good policy, I 
think it’s in the right place, but they need to increase now the 
number of personnel to take care of these people because it can be 
overwhelming.” (Health worker, KI-22)
“But my particular facility, it hosts student nurses, so some 
procedures under supervision they can ease the work load.” (Health 
worker, KI-25)
level respondents acknowledged the gap in informa-
tion dissemination explaining that the level of refund 
was according to the level of facility and type of delivery 
(box 1, KI-5). In some facilities, the FMS package covered 
the continuum of care, including antenatal, delivery and 
postnatal care for up to 1 year, whereas elsewhere, the 
policy covered only delivery services. Others questioned 
whether complications during pregnancy, such as ectopic 
pregnancy and abortion, should be included as part of 
the policy, others mentioned charging a woman who 
returned to the facility with complications after she had 
been discharged.
The information gap was also seen between the county 
government and health facilities. Health workers were 
not satisfied with the arrangement as they did not receive 
information about reimbursement and some wondered 
whether ‘the county uses it (the funds) without consulting 
them’ (KI-36). Information was not shared among the 
policy implementers or with the clients, who were also 
confused by the changes in health financing. The facility 
service charter was displayed in some facilities, providing 
information to clients about the services for which they 
were required to pay. However, participants also gave 
examples of health workers or casual staff taking advan-
tage of the lack of clarity by asking women for payments 
for maternity care in accordance with the previous user 
fee system (box 1, KI-25, 24, 19).
Informal institutional (re)arrangements
It became obvious during the interviews that the newly 
introduced formal institutional (re)arrangements were 
unclear and posed important challenges for implemen-
tation. To overcome these challenges, county officials 
and health workers (ie, policy implementers) introduced 
informal institutional (re)arrangements. For example, 
some suggested it was necessary to divert funds from the 
county budget to pay for services provided under the 
new rules ‘while waiting for reimbursement’ under the FMS 
policy (box 2, KI-30). County health officials also encour-
aged health facilities to make use of the NHIF to alle-
viate the burden of the poor reimbursement processes 
under the new policy—that is to ask women participating 
in the NHIF scheme to cover the costs of maternity care 
using their insurance scheme requiring out-of-pocket 
co-payments. But the women were reluctant to pay for 
maternity care using their insurance as they assumed the 
services were free for all (box 2, KI-39).
Another informal arrangement to ensure the avail-
ability of drugs and supplies occurred as a result of reim-
bursement problems, which inevitably meant charging 
women some fees. Health facility staff admitted that 
they had to write prescriptions for women as the facili-
ties frequently had shortages of medicines and supplies 
(box 2, KI-11). In cases of severe shortages, health workers 
asked women to buy all consumables and only the consul-
tation itself was free (box 2, KI-36). Another informal 
arrangement used by staff at facility and county level to 
overcome shortages in medicines and supplies due to late 
reimbursement was to ‘borrow’ from all other suppliers. 
Participants explained how they used this arrangement 
to ‘cope’ with the situation. Suppliers were reimbursed 
when payments were received from central government 
(box 2, KI-21).
Every county level respondent who participated in the 
interviews described how they had had to make their 
own arrangements to overcome the challenges faced in 
implementing the FMS policy. Of particular concern was 
the effect of the policy on the workload of existing staff due 
to the increased numbers of women attending services. 
Participants described making their own arrangements 
to hire locums or postgraduate doctors (whose over-time 
work was not paid) to deal with the shortage of medical 
doctors, and part-time nurses or student nurses to ensure 
sufficient nursing staff (box 2, KI-22, 25).
enforcement mechanisms
When built-in formal enforcement and self-enforcement 
mechanisms failed, mainly because county and health 
facility stakeholders felt excluded from the policy design, 
only third-party enforcement mechanisms seemed to be 
effective. For instance, participants at facility level talked 
about the media as important enforcers, acting as watch-
dogs for health facility accountability. The staff at some 
facilities were concerned about the potential loss of 
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Box 3 Illustrative quotes: enforcement mechanisms
“We cannot charge because we are in Nairobi and if we charge there 
will be a lot of noises. They will know immediately, the media will 
come immediately. So, we cannot charge, so we just run the hospital 
with the little we have until (maybe) it closes.” (Health worker, KI-16)
“The rural facilities sometimes are a bit distant we cannot 
monitor them on a day-to-day basis, so once in a while you will have 
a mother coming to deliver and they are asked to pay… we are 
aware that happens in some areas, but the way to avoid that or the 
way to mitigate that is to have supervision… they have scheduled 
supervision visits to those facilities that is one. They also have 
impromptu supervisory visits at the facilities.” (County official, KI-26)
reputation and scathing media reports if they were found 
to be charging for maternity services (box 3, KI-16).
Respondents at county and facility level believed that 
there would have been more self-enforcement and better 
co-operation by implementers if they had been invited to 
participate in the development of the FMS policy. Some 
county level respondents said that third-party enforce-
ment mechanisms were therefore essential under these 
conditions. Others commented that facilities in hard 
to reach areas where supervision mechanisms were 
weak required more stringent third-party enforcement 
through ‘impromptu supervision’ in addition to ‘scheduled 
supervision’ to ensure the FMS policy has been imple-
mented properly (box 3, KI-26).
Efficient third-party enforcement mechanisms could 
prevent potential embezzlement and ensure health 
workers do not take advantage of the situation, partic-
ularly the information asymmetry. Facility level respon-
dents shared experiences of exploitative practices—for 
example, casual workers and theatre staff who asked 
for payment from women using outdated payment rates 
from the previous user fees system and did not provide 
receipts.
Property rights
The new partially enforced formal institutions and the 
informal institutions, which key stakeholders introduced 
to help them cope, redefined the property rights (both 
decision-making and earning rights) of health workers. 
For instance, previously healthcare facilities held the HSSF 
in their own bank accounts, allowing them to manage 
their own budget. In the devolved system, budgets are 
now managed by the county health treasury, which allo-
cates funds to healthcare facilities within their catchment 
area. Income generated at the health facilities is there-
fore transferred to the county as county revenue. Under 
the current devolved system, facilities have lost the right 
to manage their own budget, including the procurement 
of medicines, supplies and equipment. Some healthcare 
facilities have closed their HSSF accounts. Some health 
workers perceived the new set-up as ‘centralisation within 
a decentralised system’ while others felt that ‘everything is 
meant to be done at the county level’.
Incentive and motivation
The property rights of health workers diminished as a 
source of funding was lost and compensation for this was 
insufficient, with consequences for the supply of drugs 
and informal charges to patients. This means that incen-
tives are not well aligned between principals (the MOH) 
and agents (health workers). This results in a loss of moti-
vation among health workers and, in turn, poorer perfor-
mance, as well as a series of critical negative consequences 
for the health system (box 4, KI-7,11,38,38).
Almost every respondent recognised that the FMS policy 
had increased the number of women receiving skilled 
birth attendance in their area (box 4). As a result, they 
appeared motivated as they had contributed to improving 
maternal and neonatal health outcomes (box 4, KI-35). 
At the same time, health workers perceived the rear-
rangement of the HSSF as demotivating, as health facili-
ties lost their decision-making power and were no longer 
able to manage their own funds (box 4, KI-15,18). This 
situation was compounded by uncertainty about the avail-
ability of funds as they depended on the budget allocated 
to them by the county health treasury. Facilities could not 
plan properly owing to the irregularity of the disburse-
ments and unpredictability of the amount received. Even 
respondents at county level acknowledged that, at times, 
the disbursement amount did not correlate with the 
numbers of deliveries conducted and there was no ratio-
nale for the value of the disbursement received, leaving 
both facilities and counties confused (box 4, KI-31).
Owing to the poor implementation of the FMS policy, 
there were few incentives to comply and it met with resis-
tance at both county and health facility levels. Some 
were concerned with the challenges they faced every 
day in implementing the policy while others felt uncer-
tain owing to a lack of clarity about the component of 
services under the FMS package. Additionally, some 
health workers did not see any obvious incentives for 
them as they were already stretched by their current 
workload (box 4, KI-9, KI-10). Some healthcare providers 
complained that implementation of the FMS policy had 
doubled their workload with no corresponding increase 
in human resources for health. National level respon-
dents were aware of this, but believed that the human 
resource shortage was worse in those parts of the country 
where there were problems with conflict and security 
(box 4, KI-15).
Respondents described how the policy did not 
set correct incentives for health workers and reduced 
their motivation. This led to a loss in quality of care which 
had an opposite effect to that intended by the policy 
(box 4, KI-2, KI-15). Additionally, some health workers 
reported that the community felt that they received less 
attention from health workers when they accessed care 
due to the increase in the number of patients at the 
health facility (box 4, KI-38).
If stakeholders in charge of implementing the policy 
(counties and health workers) have doubts about its 
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Box 4 Illustrative quotes: incentives and motivations
“…even if you provide maternity free services as a policy you need human resource and right attitude, a motivated one to provide the services for 
you to see that the indicators are good. So that aspect of motivation, in terms of taking care of the health worker, has not been streamlined, you get 
it?” (County official, KI-7)
“Some of the healthcare workers in some of the institutions because of lack of motivation, lack of good pay and nowadays we go slow.” (Health 
worker, KI-11)
“…not just motivation but you find that there could be a number of issues that you would want to try and be supportive…because maybe their 
salary is delayed for some time and they need to have a stable source of generating income.” (Health worker, KI-38)
“Yes, there are consequences. We had a mortality, a maternal mortality of which an audit, our conclusion was the system failed the patient and not 
the other way around…this was a patient who followed everything as was advised but the system failed her. She came to the hospital, she had a low 
Hb, we talked to the lab who told us they had blood, so we started transfusing. Other patients came who needed blood. Those patients were given the 
blood then blood was over. They did not inform us, we wanted three pints because one pint would sustain the patient. The patient went into labour. 
We had a black out the generator was not working. So, the patient delivered in the dark, the placenta was not completely out. The person who was 
taking care of the patient at that point did not know, because they were using their own torch, but other than that when the patient kept bleeding. This 
person kept on doing what she thought was supposed to be done which was half right because they did not know exactly what they were supposed 
to do. So, at that point when I was called in to see the patient we needed blood. There was no blood. We needed a vehicle to refer the patient; there 
was no fuel. We had just got a new medical superintendent, the nearest petrol station where we get the fuel they did not know this new medical 
superintendent. So, they were like they don’t know who they are dealing with and they will not give free petrol and basically, we were resuscitating a 
patient we know was dying, so there was nothing we could do.” (Health worker, KI-38)
“…initially they used to pay and because of lack of funding, then more mothers are not likely able to come and deliver and deliver from skilled 
attendants, so but with the introduction of free maternity, we are seeing now most of our mothers are coming to maternity places and of course 
that goes along in trying actually taking care of the reducing maternal and neonatal death and getting services from our trained personnel.” (County 
official, KI-35)
“…at the facility level, you have not received what you requested, because the management works with the devolution, some of the facilities 
accounts were closed what they used to earn, so it is being managed at the county level… the hospital management fund where you collect your 
revenue bank on a quarterly basis…” (National policy maker, KI-15)
“…initially the facility used to have the capacity to budget and spend facility improvements fund through the facility improvement fund, but under 
the devolved government, procurement is done from the county and the hospital no longer have a hospital account.”  
(Health worker, KI-18)
“The other challenge has been in terms of a capture of data, the facilities give their data of the deliveries they conducted, when they look at what 
they are compensated, at times they (the central government) don’t mention the month so it is very hard to go back and audit and see.” (County 
official, KI-31)
“Free maternity has increased the number of patients for us and human resource is a challenge. It means the demands are higher but the staff 
they are low.” (Health worker, KI-9)
“Because you have suddenly your maternity is full but you have the same number of nurses working … so even the quality of care is 
reduced.” (Health worker, KI-10)
“We have about 40% increase in terms of the workload but the number of health workers… some counties yes they are reporting that they have 
employed more but still below the expected numbers…I believe this is worse in some of the North-eastern regions where there has been conflicts or 
the terrorist threats so people have moved.” (National policy maker, KI-15)
“The challenges are if I go to a facility, I am not asked to pay but if you are putting me on the floor to deliver because there is no bed or there is no 
privacy, their curtain is all wide open, I may not use those services.” (National policy maker, KI-2)
“Removing that (financial) barrier, many people clog the facilities so the health workers were overwhelmed, quality is compromised so some of the 
regions refused to go to that free, they said they’d rather pay and get that quality service.” (National policy maker, KI-15)
“When you get to ask some of them, they would be like you increased, you encouraged us to come to hospital, you eliminated the fees that maybe 
would prevent us from coming, but my friends who came or my neighbours or my relatives who came and they said there was no one really to take 
care of them in the hospital.” (Health worker, KI-38)
“We have started experiencing that because in this county for example for the past 1 year, we have delivered mothers and we have not been 
reimbursed, one hospital like XX hospital which is very busy is owed around 20 million by the national government, so that I think is a challenge 
because this thing of just giving money, giving money and the resource purse is very limited might not be sustainable.” (County official, KI-26)
“The way they were intended is not exactly what is happening on the ground. They were supposed to be provided with free antenatal services, 
free delivery services, free post delivery services up to 6 weeks and free contraceptives after delivery, but when you go to what is happening on the 
ground, some facilities offer them free but they are not many. Most facilities still charge for everything except the delivery process itself, so at the end 
of the day it is not as free as it will appear to look.” (Health worker, KI-32)
“The President just woke up one day, in one of the National Celebrations, he decided there is free maternity care.”  
(Health worker, KI-10)
impact and sustainability, the policy will not influence 
their intrinsic motivation to improve the health of 
the population (box 4, KI-26). This, coupled with the 
decreased extrinsic motivation (ie, the policy does not 
provide financial incentives for them to implement it 
and expand the quantity and quality of care), shows how 
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the policy struggles to work in practice. Health workers 
also remarked that the policy makers did not understand 
the practical, on-the-ground situation and hence did 
not anticipate or appreciate the operational challenges 
(box 4, KI-32, KI-10).
dIscussIOn
This study highlights the consequences of discrepancies 
between formal institutions and informal arrangements 
when a new financing policy on health system govern-
ance is intoduced. The findings point to misalignment of 
incentives for policy implementation, which was further 
complicated by the concurrent devolution of the health 
system. Efforts to enforce the policy implementation 
include self- and third-party enforcement, but there were 
significant disincentives for health system personnel 
at the county and facility levels to adhere to the policy. 
In many instances, implementation of the FMS policy 
was compromised by operational challenges, including 
delay in receiving reimbursements at health facilities. 
The policy also exacerbated existing health system weak-
nesses, such as the shortages of health workers, drugs and 
supplies.
This study reveals ‘policy-induced institutional incoherence’ 
because of the discrepancies between formal and informal 
institutions. A similar example was reported in Niger 
when a free primary healthcare policy was introduced 
for children aged <5 years in 2006.25 The policy report-
edly weakened the functioning health insurance mecha-
nism. Health workers in the public health sector had no 
incentive to adhere to the new rules, as they lost a reliable 
source of non-salary income. On the other hand, Booth26 
described successful institutional coherence in Rwanda 
when the country introduced a new health insurance 
policy. The reform incentives were consistent with clear 
mandates from all line ministries and intense political 
pressure to comply with the reform.26 Those institutional 
(re)arrangements facilitated the reform. However, insti-
tutional coherence in introducing the FMS policy was not 
found in this study.
Consequently, implementers (counties and facilities) 
faced challenges of accountability, especially adherence 
to the FMS policy. For example, health workers who 
participated in the interviews openly admitted having 
to write prescriptions in order for clients to purchase 
medicines, including those covered under the FMS 
scheme. This finding is in line with the results of the 
evaluation conducted by the Kenyan MOH in 2014, with 
an estimated 28% of the women making some payment 
despite the free maternity services policy.7 Additionally, 
the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PET-PLUS 
2012) reported that, on average, health centres charge 
KSH181 (US$1.81) for a normal delivery while dispensa-
ries charge KSH45 (US$0.45).1
When resources are constrained, health workers are 
less likely to be accountable as they are not provided with 
the resources to work.16 This is shown by examples of 
non-adherence and exploitation of the situation provided 
by some health workers. Similarly, Cleary et al highlight 
three factors influencing the accountability of health-
care providers: (1) resources and capacity of key stake-
holders; (2) attitude and perception of health system 
personnel and (3) values, attitudes and culture towards 
accountability mechanisms.27 Participants also expressed 
their concerns about the poor quality of services in over-
crowded health facilities; this is particularly relevant for 
communities which cannot afford to seek care from other 
healthcare providers (ie, the private sector).
This study also highlights the way in which account-
ability has been compromised as the policy indirectly 
provides opportunities for corruption as described under 
‘formal institutional arrangements’, where participants 
gave examples of health workers taking advantage of 
the situation. The outcomes of a system depend on how 
these rules are enforced and is in line with Gustafsson as, 
‘institutions without enforcement are not institutions at all’.28 
The introduction of an institutional delivery initiative in 
Rwanda was successful owing to rigorous enforcement 
of the rules, as the Rwandan government used a combi-
nation of financial penalty and social mobilisation to 
achieve public compliance with their new rule.26 28 Those 
activities were complemented by disciplinary actions 
against staff who engaged in abusive practices towards 
women.26 These complementary efforts, institutional 
arrangements being enforced and sanctions which were 
backed up by the political pressure, contributed to the 
fruitful and widespread adoption of institutional delivery 
in Rwanda.
Incentives to adhere to the new policy are helpful 
but the situation in Kenya placed pressure on health 
workers and inadvertently provided opportunities for 
abuses.29 The policy indirectly penalised health workers 
by not compensating for fees lost by the health facilities, 
pushing health workers to raise those revenues from 
patients. Similar findings were observed among Nige-
rian government officials working in the routine immu-
nisation programme.30 The authors highlighted two 
motivating factors: incentives for high performers and 
a supportive working environment. Erchick et al empha-
sised that simply ensuring the basic needs of health 
workers (receiving sufficient salary on time) was crucial 
for motivating them to carry out their responsibilities.30
This study also highlights the importance of trans-
parency and access to information at the right time. 
Respondents at all levels reported gaps in policy dissemi-
nation and information asymmetry. Similar findings were 
reported in the evaluation conducted by the Kenyan 
MOH in 2014, which reported that a circular describing 
the services included in the FMS policy was issued more 
than a year after initiating the policy.7 Finally, many of 
the key stakeholders were disappointed that they were 
not invited to participate in, or benefit from, the devel-
opment of the policy. As they were not consulted during 
its development, stakeholders were unwilling to show 
commitment or comply once FMS became policy. Similar 
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findings were presented in the Kenyan MOH evaluation 
report and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.7 16–18 30–32
This study has a number of potential limitations. First, 
participants might have been reluctant to openly express 
their opinions during interviews for fear of recrimination. 
However, the researchers were independent of the local 
health system and this was reiterated at the beginning of 
each interview. In addition, the research was conducted 
at just one time and implementation of the policy might 
have differed in the counties excluded. Nevertheless, the 
six sampled counties comprise approximately 22% of 
the country and information from different respondents 
and the literature was triangulated to minimise bias. This 
study was conducted 2 years after introduction of the FMS 
policy; hence, it is impossible to distinguish the effects of 
FMS from those of other policies. The FMS policy was 
not introduced in a vacuum as other user fee exemp-
tions existed; organisations had already, to some extent, 
adjusted to this. We limited our study to the FMS policy, 
but recognise that other exemptions and user fee policies 
exist and to some extent will have already modified, or 
had implications for, the health system and governance. 
However, we focused the interviews on the specific FMS 
policy introduced in 2013.
For the new institutional arrangements to be imple-
mented successfully, organisations and organisational prac-
tices are crucial. This study highlights how governance of 
a health system was compromised while implementing a 
specific health policy to achieve a health system objective 
(universal health coverage). Our study provides useful 
insights for policy makers into what works and what does 
not work when introducing a new set of policy initiatives. 
This study reminds policy makers that it is critical to review 
and adjust the implementation of a new rule/policy in line 
with the organisational capacity (health system capacity) to 
implement.33 One of the main factors affecting compliance 
with the policy was the shortages of medicines and supplies. 
This echoes the results from other studies in Kenya and 
elsewhere where the removal of user fees was not accompa-
nied by other reforms necessary for implementation.17 18 25 32 
Hence, implementers lack the incentives to comply with 
the policy as they encounter operational challenges and 
perceive implementation as not feasible. Lack of participa-
tion in policy development is another reason for non-com-
pliance. A bottom-up approach to implementing a given 
policy is essential to ensure that health workers, facility 
management committees and county health management 
teams are involved throughout the process.
We recommend improving mechanisms to ensure timely 
reimbursement of free services to facilitate the successful 
implementation of a new policy. Policy makers should 
undertake a detailed examination of FMS policy elements 
and specify what needs to be reformulated to strengthen 
the logical link with the ultimate aim of universal health 
coverage. We also recommend effective dissemination of 
information and raising of public awareness to facilitate 
compliance with the policy. Institutional arrangements can 
be strengthened by strict enforcement mechanisms and 
application of sanctions. Finally, this study recommends 
establishing incentives and ensuring that appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure successful 
implementation of a new rule/policy. For instance, incen-
tives can be established by ensuring regular and timely 
disbursements (including FMS reimbursements and health 
workers’ salaries) and adequate supplies of drugs to comply 
with the new rule/policy.
cOnclusIOn
Our study explores the implications of the implementa-
tion of the FMS policy on health system governance using 
institutional analysis as a theoretical framework. To our 
knowledge, no other studies have examined how imple-
mentation of the FMS policy has affected rules governing 
health facilities. The study highlights the discrepan-
cies between formal and informal rules which create a 
misalignment of incentives for policy implementation. It 
is crucial to introduce new policies with corresponding 
institutional (re)arrangements, enforcement mecha-
nisms and incentives aligned with the objectives of the 
implementers. It is critical for policy makers to review 
and adjust the implementation of a new policy, including 
consideration of organisational capacity and implemen-
tation processes. A more careful evaluation of the process 
is needed at the same time as policy implementation, 
with research designs to capture the processes of institu-
tional change.
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